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Jurisdiction 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Ann. (1953), since the case arises from the denial of 
Appellant's petition for relief challenging the decision of the Board of Pardons and 
Parole. 
Issues on Appeal/Standard of Review 
Since the ruling of the District Court was upon motion to dismiss Appellant's 
petition for extraordinary relief, review as to all issues shall be without deference to 
the trial court's conclusions of law, but review them for correctness. Termiinde v. 
Cook, 786P.2d 1341, 1342 (Utah 1990); Rowlings v. Holden, 869 P.2d 959 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
The issues are: 
1. Is petitioner entitled to an immediate rehearing before the Board of 
Pardons and Parole because of deprivation of his due process rights at the original 
hearing? The due process rights Petitioner asserts include the lack of assistance of 
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counsel at the hearing, the right to cross examine witnesses, call witnesses and 
present evidence. 
2. Should the petitioner be entitled to the rights provided for in Neel v. 
Holden, 886 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1994)? 
Constitutional Provisions and Applicable Rules 
Article I, Section 7, Constitution of Utah. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
Rule 65B(e) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty. 
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests 
are threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph (e) may 
petition the court for relief 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) 
where an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial 
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where an 
inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has refused the 
petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is 
entitled. 
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(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the 
court may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a 
hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to 
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the inferior court, 
administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named as 
respondent to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the 
proceedings. The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance with 
the terms of Rule 65 A. 
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are 
judicial in nature, the court's review shall not extend further than to determine 
whether the respondent has regularly pursued its authority. 
Statement of the Case 
Appellant brought a petition for extraordinary relief pursuant to Rule 65B(e) 
U.R.C.P. 
seeking a rehearing of his initial hearing before the Board of Pardons and Parole 
(which occurred September 1, 1993). The basis for the relief requested was 
petitioner's lack of access to the files examined by the Board and petitioner was not 
afforded the right of cross examination of witnesses or the right to call witnesses. 
Further the District Court found he was not entitled to the rights provided for in 
Neel, id. 
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Facts 
This matter was presented and decided upon motion for dismissal filed by 
respondent. The facts, as shown by the pleading, are as follows: 
1. Petitioner was convicted and sentenced as a result of a guilty plea 
originally December 18, 1992, with the District Court entering a corrected judgment 
and sentence February 19, 1993 (three counts). 
2. Petitioner's initial hearing (the only hearing to date) before the Board of 
Pardons and Parole occurred September 1, 1993, at which time the Board did not fix 
a parole date but rescheduled a hearing for September, 1997. 
3. In the September, 1993 hearing, petitioner was not afforded the right of 
representation of counsel nor had he had counsel assist in preparation. He was not 
afforded the right of cross examination of witnesses or the right to call witnesses. 
6 
Summary of Argument 
The fixing of parole by the Board of Pardons and Parole is a sentencing 
function. Because of this sentencing function, Petitioner should be afforded his due 
process rights under Section 7, Article 1 of the Constitution of Utah. 
These due process rights should include right to counsel, for preparation and 
participation at the hearing before the Board of Pardons and Parole, the right to call 
witnesses, and the right of cross examination. Because petitioner was not afforded 
these rights, a rehearing before the Board of Pardons and Parole should be ordered 
with petitioner being afforded these rights and also the right of examination of his 
file sufficiently in advance of the hearing to adequately prepare. 
Argument 
1. Due Process 
A. Right to Counsel 
A criminal defendant has a right to counsel at sentencing. Mempa v. Rhay, 
389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254,19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967); Kuehnert v. Turner, 499 P.2d 
839 (Utah 1972); 
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McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 4, 89 S.Ct. 32, 21 L.Ed.2d 2, 4 (1968); United 
States v. Pughese, 805 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir. 1986). 
In Knenhert v. Turner, this Court discussed the importance of an attorney at 
sentencing: 
The foregoing indicates the necessity of the presence of 
counsel at the time of sentencing; so that there is a real 
opportunity to present to the court facts in extenuation of 
the offense or in explanation of the offense or in 
explanation of the defendant's conduct, as well as to 
correct any errors or mistakes in reports of the defendant's 
past record and to appeal to the equity of the court in its 
administration and enforcement of penal laws. 
(footnote omitted). 
As the United States Supreme Court has recognized: 
[T]he necessity for the aid of counsel in marshaling the 
facts, introducing evidence of mitigating circumstances 
and in general aiding and assisting the defendant to 
present his case as to sentence is apparent. 
McConnel v. Rhay, 393 U.S. at 4, quotingMempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. at 135. 
For the same reasons, counsel is of critical importance to an inmate appearing 
before the Board for a parole grant hearing as this court recognized in Foote v. Utah 
Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, the Board "performs a function analogous to that 
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of a trial judge in jurisdictions that have a determinate sentencing scheme." In order 
to effectively present his case to the Board when it performs this analogous fiinction, 
an inmate requires assistance of counsel. 
The right to counsel at parole hearings includes the right to effective 
assistance of counsel, and court appointed counsel for indigent inmates. See State 
v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah App. 1987), tiling Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335, 344-45, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796-7, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (indignant defendant 
has right to court appointed counsel). 
Although the current policies of the Board afford an inmate a right to an 
attorney at Parole revocation hearings, inmates are not afforded the right to counsel 
during parole grant hearings. Without an attorney, an inmate has little chance of 
effectively presenting his case to the Board. The policy of the board in denying 
inmates a right to counsel at parole hearings violates due process under Article I, 
Section 7, Constitution of Utah. 
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B. Right of Confrontation. 
In Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-9, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1076, 13 
L.Ed.2d 934 (1965), the Court stated: 
The primary object of the [confrontation clause] was to 
prevent depositions of ex parte affidavits... [from being 
used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination 
of the witness and cross-examination in which the accused 
has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and 
sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling 
him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they 
may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the 
stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony 
whether he is worthy of belief. 
The right to confrontation is a fundamental aspect of due process which "has 
been placed on a par with the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard and the 
right to counsel." Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1251 (modified. 706 F.2d 
311 (1 lth Cir.)), cert- denied, 464 U.S. 1002, 104 S.Ct. 508, 78 L.Ed.2d 697 
(1983), citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-5, 93 S.Ct. 1038,1045, 
35L.Ed.2d297(1973). 
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Although the United States Supreme Court has not held that the right to 
confrontation applies to sentencing, a number of courts have recognized that the 
right to confrontation applies to the penalty phase of a capital trial. See, e.g., 
Walton v. State, 481 So.2d 1197, 1200 (Fla. 1986); Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 
1227; Moore v. Zant, 885 F.2d 1497, 1511 (11th Cir. \9S9); Lanier v. State, 533 
So.2d 473, 488-9 (Miss. 1988); Beltran v. Texas, 728 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Tex. Cr. 
App. 1987). See also, State v. Glenn, 504 N.E.2d 701, 710 (Ohio 1986). 
The role of confrontation in a non-capital sentencing is less clear, but the 
need for accuracy and reliability would suggest that, at least in some situations, due 
process requires that an inmate be given the opportunity to confront the witnesses 
against him. 
In Lipsky, this court indicated that 
"the trial court may receive information concerning the 
defendant in the form of a presentence report without the 
author of the report necessarily personally appearing and 
testifying in open court...." 
Lipsky, 608 P.2d at 1244. However, "[i]f the defendant thinks the report inaccurate, 
he should then have the opportunity to bring such inaccuracies to the court's 
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attention." It seems that where a defendant challenges the accuracy of a report, his 
ability to confront the witnesses becomes of paramount importance. See United 
States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110, 121 (D.C. 1976); United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 
707, 713 (2d Cir. 1978); Howell, id at 118. 
The right to confrontation should apply to any witness who appears before the 
Board of who gives evidence. Utah Code Ann. Section 77-27-9(3) gives the Board 
the power to "issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses...." Unlike 
sentencing proceedings, victims are actively courted for their input. Fairness 
requires that inmates be given the opportunity to confront such witnesses. 
The importance of accuracy and reliability at Board hearings suggests that 
due process requires that inmates have a right to confront witnesses against them 
whenever the Board reviews information the accuracy of which the inmate 
challenges. 
2. The District Court erred in determining that Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 
1015 (Utah 1994) was not applicable in establishing due process rights in this case. 
"For the following reasons, the Court concludes Petitioner's claims fall outside the 
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protections given in both Neel and Labrum v. Utah Slate Board of Pardons^ 870 
P.2d 902 (Utah 1993):" See the second paragraph of the Conclusions of Law of the 
final order from which this appeal has been taken. 
No claim is made that the petitioner has the right to assert rights under 
Labrum since this case was not pending when the decision was rendered. However, 
this case was pending before the District Court on December 7, 1994, when Neel, 
id, was decided. The District Court concluded that the petitioner would receive no 
rights, benefits or protections from the Neel holding, apparently since Neel was the 
product of a parole revocation as opposed to an original parole hearing. This is 
contrary to the holding in Neel. Specifically, "This rationale guides our decision in 
the present case. We hold that an inmate is entitled to access psychological records 
to be considered by the Board in hearings at which the inmates released date may be 
fixed or extended." Neel, id at 1103. The Supreme Court speaks specifically 
whether to make its' ailing retroactive about the impact of reopening "every parole 
hearing at which it established an inmates release date". Neel id at 1105. It did not 
limit its1 remarks to hearings following parole revocations. Further, it indicated 
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"...accordingly, today's decision applies only to those parole grant hearings held on 
or after the date of this decision. We extend the benefits of this decision to David 
Neel and to any inmate who currently has a similar claim pending in the District 
Court or on appeal before this Court or the Court of Appeals." id at 1105. This case 
was pending in the District Court on the date of the Neel decision, December 7, 
1994. Petitioner should have been afforded all rights contained therein, which was 
specifically not adopted by the District Court. 
Conclusion 
Petitioner should have been afforded the additional due process rights at the 
initial hearing before the Board of Pardons and Parole, including the right of counsel 
in the preparation and participation in the hearing, the rights relating to confrontation 
including cross-examination, calling witnesses and introducing evidence. 
Additionally, Petitioner should have had the rights provided in Neel id which 
specifically were denied by the District Court in reaching its decision. 
The judgment below must be reversed. 
No addendum is necessary. 
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Dated this /& day of August, 1995. 
David C. Anderson 
Attorney for Appellant 
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